Megadeath Nuclear Weapons Council

Megadeath Nuclear Weapons Council, DECLASSIFIED BOOKS

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Chapter 7
The Nuclear Weapons Council
and Annual Reports
Overview
he Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) is a joint Department of Defense
(DoD) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organization
established to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the two
Departments as they fulill their dual agency responsibilities for U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile management. Nuclear weapons stockpile management
includes the full range of activities related to the development, production,
maintenance (upkeep) and elimination (retirement, disassembly and disposal) of
all United States nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons stockpile management has
evolved over time, particularly since the end of the Cold War and the demise
of the Soviet Union. he responsibilities and administrative procedures of the
Council have also evolved to accommodate changing circumstances.
he NWC serves as the focal point for activities to maintain the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile. he Council provides an inter-agency forum for reaching
consensus and establishing priorities between the two Departments. It also
provides policy guidance and oversight of the nuclear stockpile management
process to ensure high conidence in the safety, security, reliability and
performance of U.S. nuclear weapons. he NWC meets regularly to raise
and resolve issues between the DoD and the NNSA regarding concerns and
strategies for stockpile management.
he NWC is also responsible for a number of annual reports that focus senior-
level attention on important nuclear weapons issues. he Council is required
to report regularly to the President regarding the safety and reliability of the
U.S. stockpile as well as to provide an annual recommendation on the need
to resume Underground Nuclear Testing (UGT) to preserve the credibility of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent. he NWC is obligated to evaluate the surety of
the stockpile and to report its indings to the President each year. he Council,
through its oversight and reporting functions, also ensures that any signiicant
threats to the continued credibility of the U.S. nuclear capability will be
identiied quickly and resolved efectively.
7.1
NWC History
Following World War II, Congress wanted to ensure civilian control over the
uses of nuclear energy. Consequently, the
1946 Atomic Energy Act
created
7.2
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Nuclear Matters: A Practical Guide
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which has evolved into what is now
the NNSA.
he NNSA is a civilian agency responsible for the management
of nuclear energy as well as the design, development, testing, production,
maintenance, and disassembly of nuclear warheads for the U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Program. he Act did stipulate that the DoD would participate
jointly in the oversight of the U.S. nuclear weapons program to ensure the
fulillment of military requirements for atomic weapons.
7.2.1
The Military Liaison Committee (MLC)
he
1946 Atomic Energy Act
also established the Military Liaison Committee
(MLC), the predecessor of the NWC. he MLC was created to coordinate
joint DoD-DOE nuclear defense activities.
he MLC was an executive or lag-level (one/two-star) DoD organization,
which served as the authorized channel of communication between the DoD
and the DOE on all atomic energy matters related to the military application
of atomic weapons or atomic energy, as determined by the DoD. he MLC
addressed substantive matters involving policy, programming, and the
commitment of signiicant funds associated with the military application of
atomic energy. he MLC formulated the oicial DoD position on all matters
related to joint nuclear weapons issues for transmittal to the DOE.
he MLC was composed of seven members and three oicial observers. he
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (ATSD(AE)) served
as the MLC Chairman, and members included two lag-level representatives
from each of the Services. he MLC was the DoD forum for the coordination
of policy and the development of uniied DoD positions on nuclear weapons-
related issues. he DOE, the Joint Staf (JS), and the Defense Nuclear Agency
(DNA) participated as observers. An Action Oicers (AO) Group, which was
composed of AOs representing each of the seven members and each of the
three oicial observers, supported the MLC. Other organizations with a direct
interest in nuclear weapons matters, such as the National Weapons Laboratories,
frequently participated in AO-level meetings and discussions.
In the early 980s, some members of Congress expressed concern about the
high cost of funding the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program. In 984, a majority
of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) proposed the transfer of
funding responsibility for DOE nuclear weapons activities from the DOE to the
In 974, an administrative reorganization transformed the AEC into the Energy Research
and Development Agency (ERDA). A subsequent reorganization in 977 created the
Department of Energy (DOE). In 200, the NNSA was established as a semi-autonomous
agency within the DOE.
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 7
The Nuclear Weapons Council and Annual Reports
DoD. Under this proposal, the DOE would then execute its nuclear weapons-
related activities using funds provided by the DoD. he goal was to encourage
DoD nuclear weapons system acquisition decisions to account for total costs.
Other Senators, who endorsed the general purpose of the proposal, expressed
reservations about the proposed transfer of responsibility. hey were concerned
that the transfer might undermine the principle of civilian control over nuclear
weapons research and development. Although opposed to the proposed
transfer, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy supported a study of the issue.
As a result of all of this,
he National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
(FY) 1985
(Public Law 98-525) directed the President to establish a
Blue Ribbon
Task Group
to examine the issue.
7.2.2
The Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons
Program Management
On January 8, 985, the President established the
Blue Ribbon Task Group
on Nuclear Weapons Program Management
. his Task Group was chartered
to examine the procedures used by the DoD and the DOE in establishing
requirements and providing resources for the research, development, testing,
production, surveillance, and retirement of nuclear weapons. he Task
Group’s inal report was issued in July 985. While the Task Group found
the relationship between the DoD and the DOE regarding the management
of the nuclear weapons program to be generally sound, the Group identiied
areas for improvement. Speciically, the Task Group suggested introducing
administrative and procedural changes to enhance inter-Departmental
cooperation and to achieve potential cost savings. hese changes were
intended to result in closer integration between nuclear weapons programs and
national security planning without sacriicing the healthy autonomy of the two
Departments in the performance of their respective missions.
he Task Group noted the absence of a high-level joint DoD and DOE body
charged with coordinating nuclear weapons program activities. he MLC had
no such mandate. he original purpose of the MLC was to provide a voice for
the military in the atomic energy program, which was controlled by the then-
powerful AEC. By 985, the AEC had evolved into the DOE, and the original
purpose of the MLC had become obsolete.
he MLC was an intra-agency DoD group, not an interagency organization.
Also, the staf and stature of the MLC had diminished to a point where it could
no longer efectively analyze nuclear weapons cost trade-ofs, establish program
priorities, or address budget and resource allocation issues. Consequently, the
Task Group recommended the formation of a senior-level, joint DoD-DOE
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Nuclear Matters: A Practical Guide
group to coordinate nuclear weapons acquisition issues and related matters and
to oversee joint nuclear activities. he Task Group suggested that the new group
be named the
Nuclear Weapons Council
.
he Task Group recommended certain responsibilities for this new organization:
Preparing the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum
(NWSM);
Developing stockpile options and their costs;
Coordinating programming and budget matters;
Identifying cost-efective production schedules;
Considering safety, security, and control issues; and
Monitoring the activities of the Project Oicers Groups (POGs) to
ensure attention to cost as well as performance and scheduling issues.
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he Task Group believed that a dedicated staf drawn from both departments
and reporting to a full-time Staf Director would be necessary to fulill these
new responsibilities. he Task Group also argued that regardless of how the
MLC was altered, it was important for the Secretary of Defense to maintain a
high-level oice dedicated primarily to nuclear weapons matters.
The NWC Today
Acting on the recommendations of the President’s
Blue Ribbon Task Group
,
Congress established the NWC in the
National Defense Authorization Act for
FY 1987
(Public Law 99-66). A letter signed by the Secretary of Defense
formalized the establishment of the NWC.
he original 987 statute establishing the NWC and delineating its
responsibilities relected the concerns of the day. he Council was established
by Congress as a means of enhancing coordination between the DoD and the
DOE with respect to nuclear weapons production. he Council was created
when U.S. plans for continued nuclear weapons production were indeinite, and
the U.S. production capability was relatively robust. Congress was concerned
about the expense of the U.S. nuclear weapons program and wanted to realize
possible cost savings without jeopardizing the safety, security, or reliability of the
stockpile.
he statute establishing the NWC has been amended several times. Each
additional responsibility assigned to the Council has relected emerging
concerns as the Cold War ended and the Post-Cold War era began.
2
7.3
2
In addition, the law has been amended to include a broader membership.
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The Nuclear Weapons Council and Annual Reports
NWC Organization and Members
By law, the NWC is now composed of ive members: the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)); the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)); the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staf (VCJCS); the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command
(CDRUSSTRATCOM); and the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear
Security/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator.
he USD(AT&L) serves as the Chairman of the NWC. he Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs (ATSD(NCB)) is designated as the NWC Staf Director. Figure 7.
illustrates NWC membership as stated in Title 0 USC 79.
7.4
Staff Director
a
nd Executive
Secretary
ATSD(NCB)
Chair
USD(AT&L)
MEMBERS
Vice Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs
of Staff
[VCJCS]
Under
Secretary of
Defense
(Policy)
[USD(P)]
U.S.
Strategic
Command
[USSTRATCOM]
NNSA
Administrator
Figure 7.
NWC Membership per Title 0 USC 79
he law also directed the DoD and the DOE to provide personnel to serve as
the NWC Staf. From the beginning, the ATSD(NCB) performed the role of
NWC Executive Secretary in addition to the legally mandated Staf Director
function. In this role, the ATSD(NCB) manages the agendas and facilitates
the activities of the Council. As the NWC Staf Director, the ATSD(NCB)
also has oversight responsibilities for the NWC Staf and the other subordinate
organizations of the Council.
he NWC membership includes several guest and observer organizations
in addition to its oicial members. hough not voting members, these
organizations make valuable technical contributions to NWC deliberations.
NWC guest organizations include:
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E);
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration (ASD(NII));
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