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Appendix C
Nuclear Weapons Effects
Survivability and Testing
Overview
It is common to confuse nuclear weapons efects survivability with nuclear
weapons system survivability.
Nuclear weapon efects survivability
applies to the
ability of any and all personnel and equipment to withstand the blast, thermal
radiation, nuclear radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) efects of a
nuclear detonation. hus, nuclear weapons efects survivability includes, but is
not limited to, nuclear weapons systems.
Nuclear weapons system survivability
is concerned with the ability of our nuclear
deterrent forces to survive against the entire threat spectrum that includes,
but is not limited to, nuclear weapons efects. he vast range of potential
threats include: conventional and electronic weaponry; nuclear, biological, and
chemical contamination; advanced technology weapons such as high-power
microwaves and radio frequency weapons; terrorism or sabotage; and the initial
efects of a nuclear detonation.
In simple terms, nuclear weapons efects survivability refers to any and all
personnel, equipment, and systems (including, but not limited to, nuclear
systems) being able to survive nuclear weapons efects. Nuclear weapons system
survivability refers to nuclear weapons systems being survivable against any
threat (including, but not limited to, the nuclear threat). See Figure C.1 for
a summary of the diferences between nuclear weapons efects and nuclear
weapons system survivability. An overlap occurs when the threat to the
survivability of a nuclear weapons system is a nuclear detonation and its efects.
Figure C.2 illustrates the intersection between nuclear efects survivability and
systems survivability.
Nuclear weapons efects survivability refers to the capability of a system to
withstand exposure to a nuclear weapons efects environment without sufering
the loss of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. Nuclear weapons
efects survivability may be accomplished by hardening, timely re-supply,
redundancy, mitigation techniques (to include operational techniques), or a
combination thereof. Systems can be nuclear hardened to survive prompt
nuclear weapons efects including blast, thermal radiation, nuclear radiation,
EMP, and in some cases, Transient Radiation Efects on Electronics (TREE).
For a description of these efects see Appendix B,
he Efects of Nuclear Weapons
.
C.1
159
Nuclear Matters: A Practical Guide
Nuclear Weapons
Effects
Survivabilty
Survivability of Everything
Nuclear Weapons
System
Survivabilty
Survivability of Nuclear Forces
- Nuclear Weapons
- Nuclear Weapons
- Nuclear Force Personnel
- Nuclear Force Personnel
- Nuclear Force Equipment
- Nuclear Force Equipment
- Conventional Weapons
Against the Effects of Any Threat
- Conventional Force Personnel
- Nuclear Weapons
- Conventional Equipment
- Chemical, Biological Weapons
Against the Effects of
- Conventional Weapons
Nuclear Weapons
- Advanced Technology Weapons
- Special Ops Attack
- Terrorist Attack
Figure C.1
Nuclear Weapons Efects vs System Survivability
Nuclear
Weapons
Systems
Survivability
Against
Nuclear
Weapons
Effects
Nuclear
Weapons
Effects
Survivability
Nuclear
Weapons
Systems
Survivability
Figure C.2
Intersection of Nuclear Efects Survivability and Systems Survivability
Nuclear hardness
describes the ability of a system to withstand the efects of a
nuclear detonation and avoid internal malfunction or performance degradation.
Hardness measures the ability of a system’s hardware to withstand physical
efects such as overpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical
stress. his reduction in hardware vulnerability can be achieved through a
variety of well-established design speciications or through the selection of
well-built and well-engineered components. his appendix does not address
residual nuclear weapons efects such as fallout, nor does it discuss nuclear
contamination survivability.
1
Mechanical and structural efects hardening consists of using robust designs,
protective enclosures, protective coatings, and the proper selection of materials.
1
For information on fallout and nuclear contamination, see Samuel Glasstone and Philip
Dolan,
he Efects of Nuclear Weapons 3rd Edition
, United States Department of Defense and
the Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977.
160
 C
Nuclear Weapons Effects Survivability and Testing
Electronics and electrical efects hardening involves using the proper
components, special protection devices, circumvention circuits, and selective
shielding. Nuclear weapons efects on personnel are minimized by avoidance,
radiation shielding protection, and automatic recovery measures. he automatic
recovery measures compensate for the temporary loss of the “man-in-the-loop”
and mitigate the loss of military function and the degradation of mission
accomplishment.
Trade-of analyses are conducted during the acquisition process of a system
to determine the method or combination of methods that provide the
most cost-efective approach to nuclear weapons efects survivability. he
impact of the nuclear weapons efects survivability approach on system cost,
performance, reliability, maintainability, productivity, logistics support, and
other requirements are examined to ensure maximum operational efectiveness
consistent with program constraints. he diferent approaches to hardening are
not equally efective against all initial nuclear weapons efects.
Nuclear Weapons Effects Survivability
Each of the primary and secondary environments produced by a nuclear
detonation causes a unique set of mechanical and electrical efects. Some
efects are permanent and others are transient. Both types can cause system
malfunction, system failure, or loss of combat capability.
C.2
Nuclear Weapons Effects on Military Systems
he nuclear environments and efects that may threaten the survivability of a
military system vary with the altitude of the explosion. he dominant nuclear
environment refers to the efects that set the survival range between the target
and the explosion.
2
Low-air, near-surface, and surface bursts will damage most
ground targets within the damage radii. Also, high-altitude bursts produce
high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) efects over a very large area that
may damage equipment with vulnerable electronics on the ground. Figure
C.3 highlights the nuclear environments that dominate the survival for typical
systems based on various heights of burst from space to below the Earth’s
surface.
Nuclear weapons-generated X-rays are the chief threat to the survival of
strategic missiles in-light above the atmosphere and to satellites. Neutron and
gamma ray efects also create serious problems for these systems but do not
normally set the survivability range requirements. Neutron and gamma ray
C.2.1
2
he
survival range
measures the distance from Ground Zero (GZ) necessary to survive
nuclear weapons efects.
161
 Nuclear Matters: A Practical Guide
Dominating Environment
X-rays and Nuclear Radiation
Exo-Atmosphere
Nuclear Radiation
HEMP
High-Altitude
Nuclear Radiation
HEMP
Blast and Thermal
Mid-Altitude
Low-Altitude
Nuclear Radiation
Blast and Thermal
SREMP
Surface
Underwater and
Underground Shock
SREMP
Sub-Surface
Figure C.3
Dominant Nuclear Environments as a Function of Altitude
efects dominate at lower altitudes where the air absorbs most of the X-rays.
Air blast and thermal radiation efects usually dominate the survival of systems
at or near the surface; however, neutrons, gamma rays, and Source Region
EMP (SREMP) may also create problems for structurally hard systems that
are near the explosion. SREMP is produced by a nuclear burst within several
hundred meters of the Earth’s surface and is localized out to a distance of three
to ive kilometers from the burst. he inal result of the EMP generated by
the detonation is a tremendous surge of low frequency photons that can enter
a system through designed and unintended antennas, generating a low of
electrical current that overloads and destroys electrical components, and renders
the equipment non-operational.
Underwater shock and ground shock are usually the dominant nuclear weapons
efects for submerged submarines and buried shelters, respectively. HEMP is
the dominant threat for surface-based systems located outside the target zone
such as Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C
3
I) facilities
or sophisticated electronics.
Nuclear weapons efects survivability requirements vary with the type of system,
its mission, its operating environment, and the threat. For example, the X-
ray, gamma ray, and neutron survivability levels used for satellites are very low
compared with the survivability levels used for missiles and Re-entry Vehicles
(RVs), or Re-entry Bodies (RBs). Satellite levels are usually set so that a single
nuclear weapon, detonated in the region containing several satellites, will not
damage or destroy more than one satellite. he levels used for RVs, on the
162
C
Nuclear Weapons Effects Survivability and Testing
other hand, are very high because the RV/RB is the most likely component
of an ICBM/SLBM to be attacked by a nuclear weapon at close range. he
ICBM/SLBM bus and booster have a correspondingly lower requirement in
consideration of their range from the target and the time available to target
them.
When a system is deployed within the Earth’s atmosphere the criteria are
diferent. Systems operating at lower altitudes do not have to consider X-ray
efects. he gamma rays and neutrons generally set the survival range for most
systems operating at lower altitudes. he survival ranges associated with gamma
rays and neutrons are generally so great that these ranges overcome problems
from the air blast and thermal radiation. Two of the most challenging problems
in this region are the prompt gamma ray efects in electronics and the total
radiation dose delivered to personnel and electronics.
he area between ten km down to the surface is somewhat of a transition region
in which the denser air begins to absorb more of the ionizing radiation and the
air-blast environment becomes more dominant. Aircraft in this region have to
survive air-blast, thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation efects.
On the ground, air blast and thermal radiation are the dominant nuclear
weapons efects for personnel who must be at a safe distance from the range
of these two efects in order to survive. Because of this, air blast and thermal
radiation typically set the safe distance (or survival range requirements) at the
surface for most systems, and particularly for threats with yields exceeding ten
kilotons (kt).
his is not necessarily true for blast-hard systems that can survive closer to a
nuclear explosion such as a battle tank or hardened shelter. Very high levels of
ionizing radiation usually require systems to be at greater distances from ground
zero (GZ) to avoid personnel casualties and damage to electronic equipment.
his is especially true for smaller yield weapons. For example, a battle tank will
probably survive at a distance of less than one-half km from a ten kt explosion
if the only consideration is structural damage. However, ionizing radiation
from the detonation afects the crew and the tank’s electronics. Because thermal
efects are easily attenuated and have a large variation of efect on the target,
they are hard to predict. Consequently, thermal efects are not normally taken
into consideration when targeting. Although they are a large part of a nuclear
weapon’s output, thermal efects do not govern survivability considerations for
materiel objects, but they are always considered for exposed personnel.
Surface-launched missiles are in a category by themselves because they operate
in so many diferent environmental regions. Missiles have to survive the efects
of air blast, thermal radiation, HEMP, ionizing radiation, SREMP, and even X-
rays.
163
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